Competition and Car Longevity by Macauley, Molly & Hamilton, Bruce





1616 P Street, NW
Washington, DC  20036
Telephone 202-328-5000
Fax 202-939-3460
© 1998 Resources for the Future.  All rights reserved.
No portion of this paper may be reproduced without permission of
the authors.
Discussion papers are research materials circulated by their authors
for purposes of information and discussion.  They have not
undergone formal peer review or the editorial treatment accorded
RFF books and other publications.ii
COMPETITION AND CAR LONGEVITY
Bruce W. Hamilton and Molly K. Macauley
Abstract
We examine determinants of the nearly 30 percent increase in the average age of
domestically produced, registered automobiles since the mid-1960s.  We find that very little
of the increase in car longevity is attributable to improvements in the inherent durability of
cars.  Rather, we find that the temporal pattern of longevity improvement is highly correlated
with the level of market concentration in the auto industry.  In particular, we argue that the
arrival of competition in the industry led to an increase in longevity largely by forcing a
reduction in the price of auto maintenance and repair, which in turn induced consumers to
maintain their cars into older age.
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COMPETITION AND CAR LONGEVITY
Bruce W. Hamilton and Molly K. Macauley1
I.   INTRODUCTION
The average age of domestically produced automobiles has increased by nearly
30 percent since the mid 1960s--from 5.6 years in 1969 to 7.2 years in 1991 (see Figure 1).
Over the same time period, life expectancy has increased by approximately the same relative
amount (see Figure 2).  Using automobile registration data from R. L. Polk and Co., we
construct standard life tables for domestic autos, for imports, and for various individual makes
of cars.  We then examine the patterns of age-specific auto mortality rates to determine some of
the causes of the dramatic increase in longevity.  We report two significant empirical findings.
Our first finding is that regime shifts from high to low mortality occurred approximately
simultaneously across auto vintages; in those calendar years in which mortality declined, it
declined for both new and old vintages.  No mortality improvement appears to be statistically
attributable to specific vintages.  In other words, some vintages of cars began life during a
high-mortality regime, and accordingly "died off" quickly.  But when the shift to low
mortality occurred, these erstwhile fast-dying cars saw an improvement in their mortality.  Or
to put it yet another way, declines in the age-specific death rates of 5-year-old cars occurred in
the same calendar year as declines for 10-year-olds and 15-year-olds.  Regardless of any
economic explanation for this finding, it is sufficient to lead to the following conclusion:
Essentially none of the improvement in car longevity is attributable to improvements in the
inherent durability of cars, for such an improvement would not reduce death rates on older,
pre-improvement cars.2  The improvement in longevity must be due to some force external to
the cars themselves.
Our second finding is that the temporal pattern of mortality improvement is highly
correlated with the level of market concentration in the automobile industry (even after
correcting for other regressors).  This leads us to believe that the changing competitive
environment in the auto industry is likely to be an important cause of the change in the
mortality pattern.  We argue below that the arrival of competition in the industry led to an
                                               
1 Hamilton is Professor of Economics, Johns Hopkins University, and Macauley is Senior Fellow, Resources for
the Future.  Correspondence:  macauley@rff.org.  We thank Bob Crandall, George Eads, and participants in
sessions at the American Economic Association meetings, the Southern Economic Association meetings, and in
workshops at Resources for the Future and Johns Hopkins University for helpful comments.  Responsibility for
errors or opinions rests with the authors.
2 Indeed, as we will see, an improvement in the longevity of new cars should lead to a "premature" die-off of
older, pre-regime-shift cars.Hamilton and Macauley RFF 98-20
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Figure 1. Mean age, domestic fleet
Source: See text, section IV
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Figure 2.  Auto life expectancy
Source: See textHamilton and Macauley RFF 98-20
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increase in longevity largely by forcing a reduction in the price of auto maintenance and
repair, which in turn induced consumers to maintain their cars into older age.
It does not appear that the erosion of industry concentration affected longevity through
either of the obvious changes, namely, auto prices or inherent durability.  In the case of prices,
under the standard neoclassical monopoly (or the typical oligopoly) model, the arrival of
competition should have led to a reduction in the price of new cars.  But as is intuitive (and as
we show formally), a reduction in car prices should lead to a reduction, not an increase, in
longevity.  Figure 3 shows the history of average retail prices for new cars, as well as an
estimate of the time path of the hedonic price.3  The hedonic price shows a steady decline, but
as we will see it is the actual price, not the hedonic price, that governs the consumer's
scrappage decision.








Figure 3. Average new car prices
Source: The hedonic index through 1983 is from Gordon (1990) and is deflated by the CPI; after
1983, we use the CPI.  The average retail index is from Automotive Facts & Figures, various issues.
      Hedonic   + Average retail 
Index
With regard to inherent durability, though the literature is inconclusive on the
relationship between monopoly power and choice of durability, many observers believe that
monopolists are likely to offer less durability than a competitive market.  We already know,
however, that the mortality improvement was not driven by changes in inherent durability
because the pattern of mortality reduction is inconsistent with this hypothesis.
                                               
3 The hedonic price is from Gordon (1990) through 1983 and then is from the CPI new car component.  (Over
the last few years of Gordon's series, his series and the CPI component are very similar, suggesting that the
splice between the two series is likely not a problem.)Hamilton and Macauley RFF 98-20
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We believe that the observed pattern of mortality decline is most consistent with the
following hypothesis.  When the industry was more concentrated it succumbed to the "Coase
temptation" to price cars near cost, placing much of its monopoly markup not on cars but on
repair and replacement parts.  The arrival of competition in the mid-1970s reduced this profit
margin and induced consumers to maintain their cars longer.  Thus we find that the industry in
its high concentration was able to defy Coase and charge a supercompetitive price, but the
markup was predominantly on parts rather than cars.  To our knowledge, this represents the
first empirical test of any version of the Coase conjecture.
In sections II and III we discuss literature that bears on our research, the relationship
between longevity and industry concentration, and models of auto longevity.  In section IV
we describe our data and trends in auto lifetimes.  Section V is a model of the scrappage
decision and the effects on this decision of inherent durability and the prices of cars, parts,
and gasoline.  In section VI we discuss direct evidence on maintenance cost, new car prices,
and fuel efficiency.  In sections VII and VIII we estimate the empirical relationship between
concentration and longevity and discuss other evidence regarding longevity, including the
effects of imports of Japanese cars.  Section IX is a summary.
II.   MONOPOLY AND LONGEVITY
One of the major new forces in the automobile industry is competition.  In the late
1950s and early 1960s, automobile manufacturing was the most highly concentrated major
industry in the United States.  As Figure 4 shows, the Hirschman-Herfindahl index of
concentration stood at about 3500 to 3700.4  By 1990, the index stood at approximately 2000.
This decline in concentration could affect automobile longevity through several channels:
(1) the price of new cars; (2) the inherent durability of cars; and (3) the price of auto repair
and maintenance parts.
Two strands of literature address the link between monopoly power and the longevity
of durable goods.  In one strand, Swan (1972) argues that market structure has no effect on
product durability; the demand for a durable good is derived from the demand for its services,
and a monopolist maximizes profit by producing these services as cheaply as possible (i.e.,
using socially optimal durability) and charging the monopoly price.  This independence (-of-
market-structure) result rests on the assumption that longevity is a feature of the product itself
and does not depend upon consumers' maintenance decisions.
                                               
4 The Hirschman-Herfindahl index (HHI) is the sum of squares of market shares.  We calculate this index based
on sales of new automobiles in the United States (data from Automotive News, various issues).  For purposes of
calculating the index, a manufacturer's market share is its share of total sales of new cars in the United States in
that year.  Our calculations are based on the shares of both domestic and foreign manufacturers in domestic
automobile sales.Hamilton and Macauley RFF 98-20
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Figure 4. The HHI for the auto industry
Source: See text
As Schmalensee (1974) and Rust (1986) note, consumers who can purchase
competitively priced maintenance will be induced by the monopoly price of the original
equipment to maintain the good "too long."  The monopolist can respond by setting a non-
optimal inherent durability.5  The likely net effect is that durable goods survive longer under
monopoly than competition; the effect of the monopoly price upon consumers' maintenance
decisions unambiguously raises longevity, and the effect of the monopolist's countermove is
ambiguous.
The second strand of literature follows the Coase (1972) conjecture whereby a
perfectly-durable-good monopolist has no monopoly power at all and is forced "in the
twinkling of an eye" to price at marginal cost.  In the Coase model, the good is perfectly
durable; there is neither limited durability nor replacement demand.  In subsequent research,
Bond and Samuelson (1984) find that time-consistent monopoly power increases as the
durability of the good declines exogenously.  Bulow (1986) shows that a monopolist who has
control over durability can partially escape the Coase problem by reducing durability (and
thus reducing the Coase temptation).
Hamilton and Burke (1996) argue that a durable-goods monopolist which also has
market power over some maintenance and repair parts is likely to take a much larger markup
on repair parts than on original equipment.  They consider a good whose longevity is
determined jointly by inherent durability and the amount of maintenance provided by the
                                               
5 The monopolist may either raise or reduce durability from its optimum, depending upon the parameter values
of the model.Hamilton and Macauley RFF 98-20
6
consumer/owner of the good.  A monopolist selling such a good faces both the Coase time-
consistency and the Schmalensee excess-maintenance problems.  In this case, a durable-goods
monopolist with some monopoly control over repair/replacement parts can charge a relatively
low markup on original equipment and a higher markup on parts.6  In the case of automobiles,
the parts-pricing monopolist sells cars relatively close to cost and in the process creates a
monopoly market for consumables, for which there is no Coase temptation.  By charging a
high markup on maintenance parts, the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) curbs
consumers' temptation to over-maintain their cars.  Under reasonable parameter values, the
monopoly markup on parts is several times higher than on original equipment.  In this case, a
decline in market power leads to substantial erosion in the parts' markup, which in turn leads
to an increase in automobile lifetimes.
III.   PRIOR RESEARCH ON AUTOMOBILE LONGEVITY
In two respects the empirical research we present follows several prior empirical
studies of auto lifetimes.  All use either the same U.S. automobile registration data or similar
data from other countries, and all model auto lifetimes based on survival models using either
logistic transformation of the age-specific auto death rate or simply the log of the death rate.7
Our approach is similar to Parks (1977).  He begins with an intertemporal optimization
model in which survival is driven by the ratio of the initial purchase price to maintenance cost.
Instead of incorporating a logistic functional form, however, he uses a set of dummy variables
to capture the effects of age.  He also includes dummy variables for vintages; these coefficients
are generally insignificant and show no obvious relationship to any economic variables.
Greene and Chen (1981) estimate a logistic equation separately for domestic and
imported cars, and for light trucks.  They find that the shapes of the domestic and import
logistics are somewhat different, but life expectancies are very similar.  Light trucks, on the
other hand, survive much longer than cars.8
Several other studies include auto mortality.  Berkovec (1985) estimates a scrappage
model in which he regresses the log of the death rate on auto prices, price squared, and dummy
variables for vintage and class (e.g., subcompact).  Berkovec does not consider the economic
causes of the movements in mortality.  Greenspan and Cohen and (1996) estimate auto
mortality as an input to the study of the demand for new cars.  Another strand of research
examines the effect of the aging of the auto fleet on air pollution and policy options associated
with this relationship.  For example, Gruenspecht (1982) estimates the effect of federal
                                               
6 Of course, this requires the monopolist to have power over at least some repair/maintenance parts.  In the case
of automobiles, there is strong reason to believe that OEM's have substantial power in this aftermarket.  Perhaps
the strongest evidence is that an automobile purchased one piece at a time from a dealership's parts department
would be substantially more costly than a fully assembled car.
7 In addition to the research noted above, econometric models of the auto market include Bresnahan (1981);
Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995); and Goldberg (1995).  These models focus on new car demand and supply;
they do not explicitly address longevity and scrappage decisions, and Bresnahan examines only 1977-78 vintages.
8 See also discussion of the logistic scrappage function in Fenney and Cardebring (1988).Hamilton and Macauley RFF 98-20
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emissions standards set in 1981 on the composition of the fleet (extrapolated forward to 1990)
and consequently upon auto emissions.  He finds that the effect of the new standards on
scrappage is "not large;" nevertheless, in his simulations the imposition of the 1981 standards
does increase emissions of hydrocarbons and carbon monoxide up until 1985.  The increases
are small (on the range of 1-2 percent), and by 1990 the standards lead to a substantial decrease
in emissions (16.19 percent for hydrocarbons and 5.31 percent for carbon monoxide).
Alberini et al. (1995) and Hahn (1995) analyze cash-for-clunkers programs (government
offers to purchase and retire older polluting cars to reduce aggregate emissions).  Whereas these
studies tend to confirm that retirement of older cars would improve air quality, they are not
inconsistent with the basic conclusion of our study--that the aging of the automobile fleet over
the past 25 years was brought about almost entirely by forces unrelated to the tightening of
emissions standards.
Thus there is extensive research which models or incorporates auto longevity, but none of
this research considers the causes of the substantial improvement in auto longevity since 1960.
IV.   PATTERNS IN AUTO DEATH RATES
The patterns we observe in auto death rates are based on the automobile registration
data base provided to us by R. L. Polk & Co.  For each year since 1946, Polk reports the total
number of cars registered in the United States by make and vintage (beginning in 1975, each
make is disaggregated into specific models).  We calculate age-specific death rates
respectively for the domestically produced fleet and for six specific makes for each year since
1947, and for the import fleet, and for Japanese cars, since 1958.9
Polk's coverage varies somewhat from year to year.  Subsequent to 1975 they report
the number of registered vehicles in each vintage up to age 15, plus an open-ended "older"
category.  For some prior years, registration data up to age 18 plus an "older" category are
included.  In calculating the average age of cars reported in the Introduction, we have
aggregated all cars over age 15 into a single category, and allocated this group to ages
according to the following weights:  {age 16; 0.3}, {age 17; 0.25}, {age 18; 0.2}, {age 19;
0.15}, {age 20; 0.1}.  The time series of average age (Figure 1) is not very sensitive to the
weights chosen for these vintages.  We do not use this arbitrary assignment of cars to older
cohorts in any other part of our analysis.
The aging of the fleet is quite dramatic.  Just under 7 percent of 1957-vintage cars
lived to age 15.  Figure 5 shows that this fraction rose steadily to over 40 percent of 1976-
vintage domestic cars in 1991.  Figure 2, referenced in the Introduction, plots the ex post life
expectancy for each vintage from 1946 through 1976.10  Figure 2 (misleadingly) implies very
                                               
9 The Polk data for imports are not as complete as for domestics prior to 1975.  There are no data at all prior to
(calendar year) 1957, and for most years from 1957-1974 data were recorded only for age 6 and younger.  Since
almost all of the mortality "action" occurs at older ages, we are unable to estimate life tables for imports prior to 1975.
10 Life expectancies are calculated ex post from each vintage's actual survival rates up to age 15.  As noted in
the text, for all vintages life expectancy is understated for failure to include older ages.  This bias is clearly much
more significant for more recent vintages, as a much larger fraction of recent vintages survives beyond age 15.
Rough eyeball extrapolation suggests that life expectancy of 1960 vintage cars would rise by about 0.1 year if we
included data from ages 16-20, and by about .75 years for 1977 cars.Hamilton and Macauley RFF 98-20
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Figure 5.  Fraction of domestic fleet surviving to age 15
Source: See text

























Figure 6. Death rates, 10-year old cars
Source: See textHamilton and Macauley RFF 98-20
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Figure 7.  The CPI for auto maintenance and
parts, deflated
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
Figure 8. Auto maintenance per mile from PCE 
and Runzheimer
Source: See text
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average number of miles per vehicle (which has risen about 30 percent, from 9000 to 12000
miles per year, between 1970 and 1995).
Our other series on maintenance expenditure is direct estimates reported in surveys of
automobile dealers by Runzheimer International.17  Runzheimer surveys dealers (but not
independent mechanics) annually to estimate the cost of "normal" maintenance for a 2-year
old, mid-size car.  Crash repair is excluded.18  Thus the Runzheimer series is close to a direct
estimate of our  m0.19  Figure 8 shows both of these expenditure series.  They indicate the
same broad pattern, though the Runzheimer data show a much more precipitous and earlier
decline in expenditure per mile than does the series constructed from the NIPA.  This
difference is not surprising; the NIPA-constructed series covers the entire population of cars
(and, unfortunately, trucks).  The aging of the fleet from 1970 onward should have caused this
series to decline less quickly than the Runzheimer series.
Because the Runzheimer data are gathered directly from auto dealers, these data seem
to be the most reliable of the four series (though unfortunately the data are expenditure, and not
decomposed into price and quantity).20  All four series are problematic in that they include
both m0 (age-related maintenance) and m1 (age-independent maintenance), whereas only the
former influences steady-state longevity.21  Nonetheless, if the Runzheimer data are at least
approximately correct, the series suggests a fall of about 60 percent in m0 from 1960 to 1985.
From Table 1, this decline is the right order of magnitude to be a strong candidate for
explaining the secular rise in longevity.  The empirical question is then whether the pattern of
decline in expenditure is embodied in specific vintages (due to improvements in durability of
newer cars) or disembodied (due to a decline in the price of maintenance).  Given the
ambiguity of the series on maintenance prices and expenditure, we address this question by
trying to determine directly whether the decline in auto scrappage over the past 25 years
appears to be vintage-specific (embodied) or year-specific (disembodied).22
                                               
17 Runzheimer's data are published both by the American Automobile Association and the American Automobile
Manufacturers' Association. Their operating-cost data provide the basis for Internal Revenue Service mileage allowances.
18 Runzheimer also reports average insurance premiums.  Between 1975 and 1985 the average property and
liability premium fell by 54 percent, and the collision premium fell by 38 percent (in real dollars).
19 Details of the Runzheimer series were kindly provided in a telephone interview with Carl Hart of Runzheimer
International, Inc.
20 Of course, it is possible to reconcile the Runzheimer and NIPA maintenance series by postulating that the
price of auto maintenance has indeed risen about 20 percent as indicated by the CPI, and that expenditure has
fallen about 50 percent because, with improvements in built-in durability, the quantity of required maintenance
has declined (by about 60 percent).
21 For example, since batteries can easily be removed from scrapped cars, it is implausible that the price of
batteries influences the scrappage decision.
22 Parks (1977) and Greenspan and Cohen (1996) use the ratio of the new-car CPI to the auto maintenance CPI
in auto scrappage regressions.  In both studies the coefficient has the right sign and is significant.  Parks' sample
period is from 1947 through 1969 (almost entirely before the substantial rise in the maintenance CPI from the
late 1960s through the mid-1970s), and the sample used by Cohen and Greenspan is from 1973 to 1991 (entirely
after the maintenance CPI spurt).  Virtually all of the postwar variation in maintenance CPI is missing from both
studies.  When we estimate the same regression over the entire postwar period, the sign of this coefficient
becomes perverse (a rise in the relative price of maintenance leads to reduced mortality).Hamilton and Macauley RFF 98-20
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In column (c) we add HHIv, the index from the year in which the car was built, to test
for an embodied change in inherent durability associated with competition.  If competition
forced manufacturers to build more durable cars, then this effect reduces death rates only for
post-competition cars, not simultaneously for all vintages as with HHIy.  The coefficient is
significant, of the predicted sign, and about 30 percent as large as the disembodied effect.
Inclusion of HHIv has virtually no effect on the coefficient of HHIy.
In columns (d) and (e) we replace HHIv and HHIy with their 5-year moving averages.
In the case of HHIv, it seems implausible that durability responds instantly to changes in
industry concentration.  Indeed, the magnitude and significance of HHIv rise when we use the
moving average, as does the overall fit of the equation.  HHHy, on the other hand, performs
(very slightly) better than its moving average.  In the remaining regressions we use HHIv(5-yr.
avg) and HHIy.
In column (f) we include the deviation of unemployment (U) from its linear trend.  If
consumers postpone new-car purchases during recessions, they are likely also to postpone
scrapping old cars.  The coefficient is significant and of the predicted sign, and the fit
improves slightly.  In columns (g) and (h) we include (separately) linear vintage (vin) and
time trends, testing for embodied (vin) and disembodied (year) trends in mortality.  Each is
significant when entered separately, though the equation does not converge when both are
included.  In subsequent regressions we include vin but not year.
Column (i) includes the variables which were significant in the prior regressions.  In this
regression the embodied and disembodied effects of HHI are of approximately equal magnitude.
Table 3 summarizes the quantitative importance of each regressor by its contribution
to variation in life expectancy.  Entries in the table all report the variation in life expectancy
given average values of the other variables as the indicated variable ranges from its sample
minimum to its maximum.  For example, in column (b) life expectancy falls by 2.14 years as
HHIy varies from 2000 to 3700.
Table 3.  Effect of Regressors on Steady-State Life Expectancy
b c d e f g h i
HHIy -2.14 -1.74 -1.72 -1.37 -0.91 -1.00 -0.87
HHIv -0.48





(all coefficients significant at 5 percent level)Hamilton and Macauley RFF 98-20
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after the peak year 1980.  Thus there seems to be one event which caused pre-'68 cars to do
badly after 1968 and one which caused pre-'80 cars to do well after 1980.28
We next estimate (9) with both D68 and D80.  We also include D73  because the 1973
timeframe was so turbulent in the history of the automobile (with the first oil price shock and
the first binding auto emission controls).  The results are reported in the "Fleet" column of
Table 5.  The coefficients retain their significance when the dummies are entered jointly, and
the dummy for 1973 is insignificant.
Table 6 is analogous to Table 3.  The "Fleet" column of table 6 gives each regressor's
contribution to life expectancy as the regressor varies over its sample-period range, fixing the
other regressors at their sample means.  For example, as unemployment less trend varies from
-2.1 to 3.1, life expectancy falls by approximately 0.2 years.
Table 5.  Disembodied Year Effects
Table 6.  Contribution of
regressors to Life Expectancy
Fleet Buick Chevy Fleet Buick Chevy
a 3.76 3.39 4.09
(.095) (.092) (.128)
b 7.18 7.32 7.31
(.132) (.142) (.164)
g 3.67 -2.54 9.77
(1.37) (1.58) (1.85)
HHIyear -.909 -.524 -.651 -1.7* -0.8* -1.4*
(.152) (.166) (.189)
HHIvin(avg) -.146 -.036 -.090 -0.2 0 0
(.165) (.174) (.184)
vin -.0021 .001 -.005 -0.6 0.8* -1.5*
(.0027) (.0001) (.001)
U -.0054 -.0061 -.003 -0.2* -0.4* -0.1
(.0027) (.003) (.004)
D68 -.053 -.035 -.087 -0.4* -0.4* -1*
(.013) (.012) (.016)
D73 -.001 .030 -.006 0 .4 0
(.005) (.010) (.014)
D80 .103 .102 .117 1.1* 1.1* 1.4*
(.011) (.011) (.014)
R
2 .924 .931 .900
*denotes significant at 5% level
                                               
28 When we include both D79 and D80, both coefficients decrease to about 0.04; they are both significant, but
their standard errors are about double those in table 4.  We interpret this to mean that the data cannot tell whether
the break occurred in 1979 or 1980.Hamilton and Macauley RFF 98-20
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In this regression, we find a disembodied effect similar to what we started with
(equation (b) in Table 2); the erosion of industry concentration has led to approximately a 1.7
year disembodied increase in life expectancy.  On the other hand, the embodied effect (built-
in durability) is statistically insignificant and very small.  In addition, the linear vin effect is
small and of perverse sign.  The dummy coefficients show that pre-68 cars did poorly after
1968 and pre-1980 cars did well after 1980.  The dummy for 1973 is insignificant, and the
business cycle effect is small and of perverse sign.
Why might the years 1968 and 1980 stand out?  Although the first significant safety
standards became effective on January 1, 1968, Crandall and co-authors estimate the full cost
of these standards at only $138 per car.  The more important information from this portion of
the time series is that there is no significant change in mortality during the early 1970s (except
that which is explained by the other regressors).  Increasingly stringent emissions and other
standards do not appear to have reduced mortality for grandfather cars in the aftermath of the
1973 energy crisis.
It seems likely that the D68 coefficient reflects a spurious movement in HHI immediately
after 1968.  HHI fell from just over 3000 in 1968 to approximately 2500 in 1969 and 1970, and
then recovered to about 2800 in the mid-1970s.  This drop is due almost entirely to a decline in
sales by General Motors from 4.2 million autos (54.7 percent of the market) in 1967 to 3.3
million autos (46.3 percent) in 1970.  Sales partially recovered to 4.7 million (53.6 percent) in
1971.  In other words, the HHI-measured concentration declined (temporarily) in 1969 and
1970 because GM, the industry leader, had a couple of bad years.  Given the estimated HHIy
coefficient, mortality of pre-'68 cars "should" have fallen just after 1968 but did not.
Reduced grandfather mortality after 1980 may be due to the Voluntary Export
Restraints (VER) entered into with Japan.  With this agreement, the "effective" HHI was
likely considerably higher than the calculated HHI, since Japan and Detroit were effectively
precluded from competing for market share.29  As many observers have noted, Detroit
evidently took advantage of the VER to raise the price of its new cars.30
Aside from 1968 and 1980, there is no evidence of embodied effects which left
transitional legacies with older vintages.  Most significantly, the dramatic fuel-economy
improvements of the late 1970s did not result in the large predicted die-off of old gas
guzzlers.  One possibility, of course, is that these fuel-efficiency improvements just offset
some negative embodied changes.
Vintage Vintages
Next we look for the effect of embodied changes not in the grandfathers but in the new
cars themselves.  We estimate the fleet regression of Table 5 separately with a vintage dummy
                                               
29 Of course, the VER, as price effect, should have reduced scrappage of new cars as well.  We do not have the
data to study this, as the sample period ends in 1991 when these cars are still quite young and not likely to die.
30 Winston and Associates (1987) estimate that VER raised the prices of 1984 domestic cars by 8.0 percent.
According to table 1, this price increase is too small to have generated an almost-one-year increase in lifetimes.Hamilton and Macauley RFF 98-20
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for each vintage from 1950 through 1985 (we omit D73, which was small and insignificant).
Inclusion of the vintage dummy has virtually no effect on the remaining coefficients.  Figure 9
illustrates the vintage dummy coefficients which are statistically significant, converted into
their contribution to life expectancy and correcting for the other regressors.  For example, the
coefficient for vintage 1950 implies that 1950-cars had a life expectancy 0.44 years greater
than other vintages.
50   52  54  56   58   60   62   64   66   68   70   72   74   76
    1
 0.5
    0
-0.5




Figure 9.  Unexplained longevity
Source: See text
Cars of vintage 1958 survived almost 1.5 years less than otherwise similar cars.  Cars
built in the early 1970s also do poorly, likely due to the rapid onset of regulations which
forced Detroit to build less well-engineered cars in the early '70s (as argued by Crandall and
co-authors).31
Specific Models
Particularly in the case of these specific-year embodied effects, it seems prudent to
examine separate automobile models.  For example, energy-price shocks may have
differentially affected large and small cars.  Because we do not have pre-1976 data on specific
models, we work with automobile makes.  We report results for 1962 Buicks and Chevrolets,
                                               
31 We are unable to estimate precise coefficients for vintages later than the late '70s as we increasingly lose data
on the older cars (the part of the age distribution in which high or low mortality most starkly reveals itself).
Thus the lack of significant coefficients from the 1980s conveys little information about the inherent durability
of these vintages.Hamilton and Macauley RFF 98-20
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chosen because they are near opposite ends of the price distribution and because Buicks prior
to the energy crises tended to be larger and less fuel efficient than Chevrolets (see Table 7).32
Table 7.  Characteristics of 1962 Models
Horsepower Wheelbase Price Weight
Chevy* 80-170 110-119 1800-2450 2250-3500
Buick 155-325 112-126 2475-3450 2700-4319
Data for 1962 models from Kelley Blue Book
Price is 1962 (November-December) used-car price for 1962 model.
*Excludes Corvette
We proceed in the same manner as with the fleet.  We first estimate (9) separately for
each year from 1951-1989; the pattern (not reproduced here) is virtually identical to that for
the fleet.  Next we estimate (9) separately for Chevys and Buicks, including D68, D73, and D80.
The results appear in the "Buick" and "Chevy" columns of tables 5 and 6.  For both makes,
the disembodied HHI effect is large and significant; the embodied effect is small and
insignificant.  For Buicks, life expectancy grows linearly with vintage (by .8 years),
suggesting a steady improvement in inherent durability.  But for Chevys, life expectancy
declines by .75 years as vintage goes from 1948 to 1990.  For both makes, unemployment has
a perverse sign, pre-'67 cars did badly after 1967, and pre-'80 cars did well after 1980.
Interestingly, we find that pre-'73 Buicks did well after 1973; whatever happened in 1973
added about .35 years to the life expectancy of old Buicks.  It certainly does not appear that
the energy crisis caused consumers to retire their old Buicks after 1973.
Figure 10 shows the cross-section life expectancies of both Chevys and Buicks from
196033 through 1990.  From 1960 through 1967, Chevys lived approximately a year longer
than Buicks.  Over the next 15 years Buick generally outlived Chevys, though in most years
the difference was less than ¼ year.  Beginning in the mid-1980s, Buicks began to outlive
Chevys by as much as half a year.
This pattern, on its face, is odd.  As we have seen, Buicks in 1962 were about 50
percent more expensive than Chevys; this should have caused Buicks to outlive Chevys by
about 2 years.34  We believe that the market-power/parts-pricing model discussed earlier
offers the explanation for the mortality pattern displayed in Figure 10.  During the 1960s the
market for high-end cars was less competitive than that for low-end cars, with the result that
                                               
32 We estimated similar regressions for Fords, Mercurys, Chryslers, and Oldsmobiles, with very similar results
(not reported).  We also attempted to estimate the regression for imports, but the poor quality of the data prior to
1975 made this impossible.
33 1960 is the first year for which life expectancies can be constructed solely from post-war vintage cars.
34 When we examine other makes, the pattern is quite similar.  Until the late 1960s, more expensive makes died
substantially younger than cheaper makes; in more recent years there has been little mortality difference between
cheap and expensive makes.Hamilton and Macauley RFF 98-20
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the parts-price markup was also higher on high-end cars.  The early deaths of Buicks in the
1960s were brought about by the market-power-induced markup on parts.  Since then, the
mortality patterns of Buicks and Chevys have converged because the competitive
environment for Buicks converged to that of Chevys.
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VIII.   JAPANESE CARS
There is a widely held popular perception that beginning in the early- to mid-1970s,
Japanese manufacturers began to flood the domestic U.S. auto market with fuel efficient and
durable cars, and that with a long and reluctant lag, American manufacturers began to match
the Japanese.  Our explanation, focusing on the effect of competition on maintenance-part
prices, gives a prominent role to Japanese cars and the competitive pressure they imposed on
the domestic industry.  But it does not give a large role to increased inherent durability, either
forced by Japanese manufacturers or for any other reason.  Here we take a more explicit look
at Japanese cars.
The superior-Japanese-cars explanation is inconsistent with the direction and timing of
events.  Japanese cars became a major part of the auto market in the mid-70s (see Figure 11).
Through the transitional effect discussed above, this should have led to retirement of older
domestic autos.  From Figure 6, however, the mid-70s saw a steady improvement in survival
rates of older domestics.
Evidence on the superior maintenance characteristics of Japanese cars comes from
Crandall and co-authors who tabulate Consumer Reports readers' surveys on frequency ofHamilton and Macauley RFF 98-20
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repair.  Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, these tabulations show that the frequency-of-repair
record for Japanese cars is consistently much better than for domestics.  However, they note
that the data are far from ideal in that the sample is self-selected and the criterion is
subjective.  We circumvent both problems by comparing survival rates of Japanese and
American cars for various vintages beginning in the late 1960s.
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Figure 11. Japanese share of the U.S. auto market
Source: Automobile Facts and Figures (various issues).
The three panels in Figure 12 show the death rates by age for Japanese and domestic
vintages.  For 1968 vintages, beginning at age 6, Japanese auto death rates are significantly
below those of domestic autos.  For vintage 1971, Japanese and domestic auto death rates are
virtually identical until age 9, after which Japanese cars do substantially better.35  By the 1977
vintage there is essentially no difference.
The only support for superior durability of Japanese cars comes from the very small
vintages which were imported well before the surge years of Japanese cars.  Surprisingly, for
vintages beyond the early '70s, Japanese and domestic cars look indistinguishable.  The
popular hypothesis, that Japanese cars during the boom years were more durable than
American cars and that American manufacturers finally caught up in the late '80s, finds no
support in the data.
                                               
35 Though Japanese '71s had higher survival rates after age 9, the boost came too late to have a very large effect;
26.9 percent of Japanese '71s survived to age 15, compared with 21.5 percent of domestics.Hamilton and Macauley RFF 98-20
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Figure 12. Japanese and domestic auto death
rates, by vintage
Source: See text







     0
J71         D71







     0
J77         D77
IX.   CONCLUSION
Given the timing of changes in auto death rates, we conclude that essentially none of
the massive increase in automobile longevity over the past 25 years can be attributed to
improvements in the inherent durability of cars.  The rise in lifetimes was driven by some
force external to the new cars themselves.
The strong correlation of mortality rates with the Hirschman-Herfindahl index of
industry concentration leads us to believe that much of the longevity increase was induced by
competition, and we find that the most plausible mechanism through which competition would
raise lifetimes is through an erosion of repair-and-replacement parts prices.  A simple model of
auto scrappage enables us to determine that roughly a 50 percent decline in parts prices would
be sufficient to explain the recent decline in auto mortality.  This magnitude coincides closely
with the roughly 60 percent decline in the cost of maintenance per mile for 2-year-old cars, as
estimated by Runzheimer International.  Finally, there is some evidence that the Voluntary
Export Restrictions with Japan increased car longevity in the early 1980s.  But there is no
evidence of a retirement of fuel-inefficient cars in the aftermath of either oil shock.Hamilton and Macauley RFF 98-20
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